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Executive Summary
Catch shares are fishery management programs that allocate fishing privileges
in the form of a specific portion of the total annual catch quota. These programs
range from individual transferable quotas to community-based management
systems such as sectors. While catch shares take many forms, in general they
allocate the quota to allow fishing entities—individuals, communities,
cooperatives, etc.— exclusive access to a portion of the quota, but require
that fishing cease once that entity’s share of the quota is met.
Science-based annual catch limits are essential if catch shares are to be effective
and if requirements to end overfishing and rebuild depleted fish populations are
to be met. These limits ensure that the amount of fish taken each year remains
at levels that allow fish populations to reproduce and maintain an adequate
biomass to support maximum sustainable catch. After science-based catch limits
have been determined, the quota can be allocated to participants in the fishery.
This allocation must be done with careful consideration of the socioeconomic
changes that may result.
The critical decisions about how a catch share program is designed and
implemented, and who receives an allocation, must be given careful analysis.
A properly designed program must include:
• science-based annual catch limits that include all fish killed as a result
of fishing (target fish landed and non-target fish—or bycatch—
discarded at sea)
• adequate monitoring of the target fish catch and bycatch
• identification of explicit conservation, social and economic goals that
the program intends to achieve and metrics for measuring attainment
of those goals
• permits issued for no more than 10 years and regular review and
evaluation of program performance with opportunities to modify and
improve the program, as required by section 303A of the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
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• adequate enforcement, including validation of catch and discard
reporting and, to the extent possible, real-time management with the
authority to close the fishery as soon as the quota is reached
• fair and equitable allocation through a transparent and open process,
including mechanisms to accommodate recreational anglers, working
fishermen and coastal communities; ownership caps so that one entity
does not hold an excessive share of the quota; and opportunities for
new fishermen.
Ocean fish are public resources. Catch shares, therefore, grant privileges to only
a portion of the total catch and do not convey exclusive property rights to the
resource. These programs can improve fisheries performance, management
and ecosystem health, but only if properly designed and monitored. Correctly
applied, catch shares are viable management options along with other measures
such as adjusting the length of the fishing season, refining areas that are opened
or closed to fishing, restricting gear to protect fish habitat and limiting catch size.
Catch shares are not, however, a panacea. They should be part of a comprehen-
sive approach that strengthens conservation and supports communities by
providing access for recreational anglers and diverse fleets and crew, qualities
regarded by many as the heart and soul of a working waterfront.
Science-based catch limits that don’t result
in overfishing are critical to ensuring long-
term sustainability; properly designed catch
shares are a way to allocate those limits.
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Design Matters: Making Catch Shares Work
Catch shares have been widely lauded for their economic and ecological benefits.
Indeed, recent studies in the journals Science and Nature describe catch share
programs as a solution to fishery collapse, and some conservation groups have
proposed that each sector of U.S. fisheries be required to consider catch shares
or explain why the management system being used instead is superior. Like other
management tools—such as limits on fishing seasons, gear restrictions, area
closures and size requirements—catch shares can be a viable tool if correctly
designed and applied. However, there are significant questions regarding the
actual impact of these programs (as opposed to other management tools) on the
ecological health of the fisheries in which they have been implemented, as well as
on their economic impacts—the latter of which is the specific focus of this paper.
The current discussion on catch shares too often focuses on the economic
benefits that have accrued to the fishermen and fishing communities that are able
to participate in these programs, without adequate consideration given to the
economic downsides of these programs for those who have been left out. This
paper does not seek to provide a detailed, thorough analysis of catch share
programs. Rather, its purpose is to highlight some of the economic downsides
of these programs, while simultaneously acknowledging their benefits, in order to
provide a broader context for discussion. We believe that catch shares, like many
management tools, are not a cure-all for the various problems facing fisheries in
the United States and elsewhere in the world. To be effective, they need to be
implemented as part of a comprehensive approach that includes measures aimed
at reducing the scope and severity of negative fishing impacts on the marine
environment, while also taking into account the economic needs of fishermen
and fishing communities. What follows is a discussion of catch shares: examining
problems created by this tool and indicating possible ways to minimize those
problems through effective program design.
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In theory, fishing privileges and exclusive access
to a portion of the catch give fishermen an
incentive for economic efficiency and prudent
stewardship of the resource. Economic theory also
suggests, however, that for market forces to work
effectively, the privileges need to be permanent,
secure, restricted and transferable.4 Since fisher-
men have little control over fish populations,
exclusivity is reduced and the “tragedy of the
commons” problem occurs—that is, all fishermen
suffer when individual fishermen maximally use
public resources for their personal benefit.
Granting permanent rights to a public resource
runs counter to the public trust doctrine that
holds that certain lands and their natural resources
belong to the public and that, although the
government is the legitimate administrator of
those lands, resources must be managed for the
public good rather than for the exclusive benefit
of private individuals.5 Additionally, the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MSA) states that quota shares
are not property rights, but privileges to fish.
The MSA further defines catch shares as Limited
Access Privilege Programs (LAPPs). While catch
shares are often equated only with individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) or individual fishing
quotas (IFQs), the system also includes other
quota share arrangements, among them
community development quotas (CDQs), sector
allocation, and community and regional fishing
associations. Typically, various forms of catch
shares have been used in commercial fisheries,
where participants are readily identifiable.
However, there is increasing interest in employing
catch share programs in recreational fisheries,
which face significant challenges, including the
absence of real-time data, insufficient monitoring
and untested methods of assigning quotas to
individual anglers.
What Is a Catch Share?
Catch share is an umbrella term that includes a number of fisheries management
strategies. Catch share programs allocate fishing privileges as a share of allow-
able catch to individuals, cooperatives, communities or groups of fishermen.1
Figure 1 represents the hierarchy of programs. They are incentive-based tools
that bestow privileges to access a public resource (not a property right) and that
are thought to enhance fishermen’s flexibility and efficiency by allowing them
to choose how and when to catch their portion of the quota.2 Studies of catch
shares have found that they can improve economic and environmental health
and eliminate the “race to fish,” thus enhancing safety and minimizing
bycatch and other ecosystem impacts.3
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Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) are allocated to
eligible fishermen, allowing them a specific por-
tion of the total allowable catch (TAC). The MSA
defines IFQs as a federal permit to catch a certain
quantity of fish (a percentage of TAC); the permit
is held for the exclusive use by a person; thus, it is
distinct from a community development quota.6
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) can be
bought, sold or transferred to other fishermen.7
While ITQs are sometimes construed as a prop-
erty right, U.S. law states that there is no creation
of right, title or interest and that the quota can be
revoked, limited or modified at any time without
compensation.8
Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPPs) are
defined by the MSA as a federal permit held for
exclusive use by an individual to catch a portion
of the total quota. IFQs are a form of LAPP, but
LAPPs include more than IFQs. LAPPs allow
flexibility for allocating the total quota, whereas
IFQs are always a percentage of the total quota.9
Community Development Quotas (CDQs)
allocate portions of the annual TAC to coalitions
of villages with limited economic opportunities
(e.g., rural coastal communities in western
Alaska).10
Sector Allocation gives a portion of a quota,
in accordance with an approved plan, to a
self-selecting group of fishermen bound by a
contractual agreement. The participants allocate
the quota to those in the sector. These allocations
are a form of harvesting cooperative, but the
MSA does not consider them to be LAPPs
because allocations are granted to the whole
sector rather than to individuals.
Recently, community-based fisheries manage-
ment (CBFM) has attracted considerable interest;
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found that “the easiest and most direct way to
help protect communities under an IFQ program
is to allow the communities themselves to hold
quota.”11 CBFM encompasses programs such
as CDQs, cooperatives and sectors. In CBFM
programs, communities play a large role in man-
aging their fisheries and protecting the resource.
These programs have been established in Alaska,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nova Scotia and Mexico.
Each type of catch share program has its strengths
and weaknesses, and the diversity of U.S. fisheries
and fishing communities necessitates a variety of
approaches. Because each fishery is unique, catch
share programs must be tailored to its needs and
challenges and the communities that depend on it.
FIGURE 1
Some Types of Catch Shares
Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPPs)
Dedicated Access Privileges (DAPs)
Individual Quotas (IFQs, ITQs)
Community Quotas
(CDQs, Cooperatives, Sectors)
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The MSA details discretionary provisions that
could be included in fishery management plans,
including the establishment of a LAPP. The law
stipulates that in developing such management
programs, regional fishery management councils
shall consider historical and present-day fishing in
the fishery, the communities and economies that
would be affected, and the “fair and equitable
distribution of access privileges.”13 In addition,
under the MSA, a LAPP must include regular
monitoring and review, a system for enforcement
and monitoring, and a mechanism to prevent
an entity from acquiring an excessive share.
More importantly, the MSA requires that a
permit issued under a LAPP cannot exceed
10 years but that it will be “renewed before the
end of that period, unless it has been revoked,
limited, or modified.”14 In addition, the MSA
requires that catch share holders pay the costs
of the program’s implementation.15
The Magnuson-Stevens Act
The MSA12 describes catch share programs such as IFQs as limited access
privilege programs (LAPPs), while the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
describes them as dedicated access privileges (DAPs) to emphasize that
they are not a property right (Box 1).
BOX 1
The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy supported use of the term dedicated access privilege
to underscore that shares of a quota grant access for fishing, but not a right to the fish.
The Commission’s Recommendation 19-15 proposed that the National Marine Fisheries
Service be responsible for issuing national guidelines for such programs, and it outlined
several key features:16
• specifying goals (biological, social and economic)
• providing for periodic review
• limiting the duration of quota shares
• establishing user fees to fund the program and support ecosystem-based management
• allowing for public participation by and consultation with all stakeholders.
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Pacific Sablefish
Permit Stacking
Gulf of Mexico Red
Snapper IFQ
Gulf of Mexico
Grouper IFQ
Atlantic Sea Scallop
General Category IFQ
Georges Bank Atlantic
Cod Fixed Gear Sector
Georges Bank Atlantic
Cod Hook Sector
Mid-Atlantic Golden
Tilefish IFQ
Mid-Atlantic Surf
Clam/Ocean Quahog
South Atlantic Wreckfish
Western Alaska Community Development Quota
(Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands quotas for
groundfish, halibut and crab to eligible western
Alaskan villages)
Alaskan Halibut
and Sablefish
Central Gulf of Alaska
Rockfish Pilot
Bering Sea King
and Tanner Crab
Bering Sea American
Fisheries Act Pollock
Cooperatives
Bering Sea Groundfish
(Non-Pollock) Cooperatives
Individual Fishing Quotas/Individual Transferable Quotas Community Development Quotas/Sectors
15 Active Catch Share Programs in U.S.
In addition, several more catch shares are in active development, including the West Coast Groundfish
Trawl Individual Quotas and 17 sectors proposed in New England under an amendment to the Northeast
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan.17
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No Single Solution
Catch shares are not a cure-all for fisheries management problems and should
not be considered an end unto themselves; rather, they should be evaluated
as one of a number of possible tools that councils can employ when developing
management plans.
Catch shares function as an allocation tool to
achieve management objectives for fisheries and
to obtain a continuing optimum yield of fish catch.
To prevent overfishing, fishing must remain within
science-based annual limits through improved
accountability and enhanced monitoring.
Catch share systems can be effective and lead
to substantial benefits from economic efficiency
and capacity reductions. However, it is unrealistic
to assume a catch share program will guarantee
desired change and provide a single, simple
remedy. Overfishing and other fisheries problems
require a package of measures, including catch
shares (where appropriate), gear and effort
controls, and spatial management.18 In addition,
poorly designed catch share programs may
encourage compensatory behavior such as
increased discarding and misreporting or
underreporting of catch. They can also induce
fishermen to upgrade their vessels and gear
when the number of vessels in the fishery falls,
thus increasing fishing effort.
In addition, catch share programs may not be
appropriate for some fisheries and may lead to
unintended consequences. Among these
fisheries are:
• recreational fisheries where managers lack
real-time data or the ability to effectively
manage an allocation of quota (for-hire and
charter segments may be an exception)
• fisheries where the size of the population
fluctuates widely (resulting in significant
variations in the value of quota shares)
• fisheries with poor or unreliable catch data
• fisheries that lack monitoring, enforcement
or a hard TAC.19
In addition to these fisheries, there may be others
where such programs may be ineffective. For
example, the slow growth and late maturity of a
species can create an economic incentive for
fishermen to catch and sell fish now rather than
conserve them because the economic payback for
conservation is so far in the future, thus minimiz-
ing the economic-efficiency gains sought through
catch shares. To counter such negative incentives,
positive ones must be established—for example,
the management of orange roughy requires a
program that offsets incentives to catch and sell
fish now and instead focuses on conserving the
population for the future.20 Catch shares are also
of limited use in British Columbia, where five
species of salmon spawn in more than 1,500
streams. Therefore, these wide fluctuations in
salmon population size and distribution make
it impractical to implement IFQs.21
Additionally, the performance of catch shares
depends upon when and where quotas are
used. Catch shares may not be fully effective
for fish populations found in various locations
at different densities and times. Under these
conditions, fishermen will target highly abundant
fish populations and compete for the higher-
valued species.22
Catch shares are not a panacea for all
fisheries management problems and should
not be an exclusive goal; rather, they are
one of a number of possible management
tools regional fisheries management
councils can employ.
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Unintended Consequences
Further empirical research is necessary to
determine whether catch share programs
can address and manage broader ecosystem
concerns, such as the unintentional catching
of non-target species, habitat destruction
and changes to the food web.
Catch share programs may also cause adverse
social and economic consequences, including
consolidation (concentration of quota in just a
few large operations), loss of jobs, reduced
income, unemployment and displacement of
small-scale fishermen.24 Consolidation was
apparent in the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam/Ocean
Quahog fishery when the fleet shrank from 128
vessels to 59 in just two years. By 1995, the largest
quota holders were outside investors (a bank
and an accounting firm).25 In contrast, the Alaskan
halibut/sablefish fishery IFQ program was
designed to minimize socioeconomic impacts
by capping the quota share that a single fisher-
man or entity could have, prohibiting absentee
ownership and creating categories of quota
based on vessel size with rules against transfer-
ring quota to another category. Because they
are data-intensive, catch share programs may
also result in increased administrative costs
(to train staff, hire observers, enforce quotas and
collect data for accurate stock assessments) as
well as in prohibitive costs for fishermen trying
to enter the fishery as lease and quota prices
escalate.26 Once established, such programs
may be difficult to adjust as conditions or
management change because of vested
interests in the fishery and potential difficulty
in modifying or revoking shares.
Socioeconomic inequities that catch shares
create or magnify are a critical concern. These
inequities may arise from initial allocation of
quota shares or from the ability of some quota
holders to acquire more shares and dominate a
fishery.27 For instance, in the IFQ programs
implemented in various British Columbia fisheries,
reducing the number of available licenses
through buybacks and policy reform also reduced
the size of the fishing fleet and led to escalating
license and quota prices.28 As a result, the costs
of licenses and quotas are now prohibitively high.
Rural, small-scale and aboriginal fishermen can
no longer afford to participate in the fisheries;
consequently, the number of rural licenses has
dropped roughly 45 percent.29 A GAO report
underscored this point, concluding that IFQ
programs have “raised concerns about the fair-
ness of initial quota allocations, the increased
costs for fishermen to gain entry, and the loss of
employment and revenues in communities that
have historically depended on fishing.”30
Catch shares, as well as other types of fisheries management programs, can
unintentionally create incentives for unsustainable fishing practices, such as:
high grading—discarding low-market-value fish in favor of those with higher
value to maximize quota returns; underreporting catch; overfishing non-quota
species in multispecies fisheries; and poaching.23
Single-factor solutions are not always
sufficient: overfishing and other fisheries
problems require a package of measures,
including catch shares (where appropriate),
gear and effort controls, and spatial
management.
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An analysis of 20 fish populations managed under
IFQs in many countries found that 12 populations
improved after IFQ implementation, while eight
continued to decline.31 Although IFQs played a
role in helping some fisheries reduce capacity,
end the race to fish and improve compliance
with quotas, it is unclear to what extent these
changes were due to IFQs or the larger manage-
ment plan of which IFQs were a part. In some
fisheries, improvements were more likely the
result of hard TAC limits than an IFQ system.
This was demonstrated by declines in populations
in fisheries where limits were set too high or com-
pliance was lacking even with an IFQ system in
place.32 Moreover, some IFQ fisheries may require
additional, complementary measures for effective
management, such as seasonal or area closures
and gear restrictions to protect juvenile fish.33
In addition, management of multispecies
fisheries can be challenging because both target
and non-target fish are generally caught together,
causing the quota of one species to constrain
the catch of relatively healthy species. However,
if all species caught together are included in a
properly designed and monitored catch share
system with appropriately set catch limits for all,
the number of discards (low-value, non-target
species thrown back) can decrease. For instance,
in British Columbia’s groundfish trawl fishery, an
IFQ system and at-sea observer coverage have
successfully discouraged discarding and led to
matching catches for individual species to their
quotas in this multispecies fishery. This is due to
the fishermen’s ability to adjust their fishing
practices and target species to match changes in
catch limits. These fishermen avoided rougheye,
shortraker and yelloweye rockfish when limits
were reduced for these species. The system,
which includes annual catch limits for individual
species, dockside monitoring, mortality limits
(instead of landing limits) and accounting for
catch in subsequent years (i.e., carry-forward of
up to 37.5 percent for overruns and underruns),
has resulted in fewer discards (a 51 percent
decrease after IFQ introduction) than in similar
U.S. fisheries.34
Mixed Results
The use of a catch share program does not necessarily result in consistent,
positive changes in the size and health of a population. For example, IFQs have
been widely used in a variety of fisheries and illustrate a range of effects.
In some fisheries, improvements are more
likely to result from hard total allowable
catch limits than because of an ITQ system.
This was demonstrated by declines in fish
populations for fisheries where limits were
set too high or compliance was lacking
even when an ITQ system was in place.
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The IPQ program was intended to achieve equity
between the harvesting and processing sectors
by assigning processor quota shares to proces-
sors based on the amount of fish that each had
processed over a period of time.35 In an IPQ
program, fishermen with IFQs in the fishery may
sell fish only to processors with processor quotas
in the fishery. In the Bering Sea and Aleutian
Islands crab fishery IPQ program, 90 percent of
the market is limited to processors with quotas.36
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council
(NPFMC) struggled with instituting the crab
rationalization plan—to match fishing capacity
to the amount of crab that could sustainably be
caught each year—in large part because of
controversy over establishing processor quotas.
The program did not take effect until Congress
mandated it when the MSA was amended
through the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2004.
IPQs like the one established in the Alaska crab
fishery are highly controversial due to their
potential for discouraging competition in the
marketplace. The U.S. Department of Justice
advised the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration to oppose IPQs on the grounds
that they would inhibit efficient use of resources
and thwart beneficial competition, leading to
distortions in the market by giving companies
excessive control over price and product.37 As a
result, language in the MSA requires IPQs to
comply with antitrust laws. Also, in the face of
much criticism of the crab rationalization plan,
the NPFMC decided to require the collection
of extensive socioeconomic data and to review
progress at 18 months, three years and
five years.38
Consolidation became a significant issue in the
crab rationalization system because only a few
companies stood to gain from the redistribution
of capital. In the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery,
the number of boats fell from 251 in 2004 to 89 in
2005-6 after IFQ implementation; likewise in the
Bering Sea snow crab fishery, the number of boats
dropped from 189 in 2004 to 80 in 2005-6.39
These declines resulted in an estimated loss of
1,200 jobs from 2004 to 2006.40 Other estimates
of the economic impact were seen in small
Alaskan fishing communities such as King Cove,
where there was a 75 percent reduction in income
for local businesses,41 and in Kodiak, where Bristol
Bay red king crab fishermen’s earnings declined
between $1 million and $1.6 million following
rationalization.42 For those left in the Bristol Bay
king crab and the Bering Sea snow crab fisheries,
however, fleet-wide crew member pay increased
from an average of $24,314 in 2004 to an average
of $53,585 in 2007.43 Remaining vessel owners in
the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery saw their
average harvest increase from 56,000 pounds per
vessel in 2004 to 185,000 pounds in 2005-6, and
the average value of their catch increase from
$262,000 in 2004 to $792,000 in 2005-6.44
In addition, processor shares have been highly
consolidated, leaving only a few corporations
in control of the industry and raising antitrust
concerns. Trident Seafoods, for example, was
allocated 23.3 percent of the red king crab quota
and 25.8 percent of the snow crab quota.45
High-grading also became a problem in the
fishery. An estimated 677,000 legal male crabs
were discarded in the first year of rationalization,
compared to the six years prior to rationalization,
when the highest estimate for total discarded
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization
In 2005, to improve conservation efficacy and address social and economic
concerns, the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fishery was restructured and
downsized through IFQs and individual processing quotas (IPQs).
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legal males was 80,000 crabs in the 2002 season.46
In response, the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game adjusted the quota down for the 2006-7
season to account for the high number of dis-
cards, and the crab industry agreed to implement
measures to remove the incentive to high-grade.
Discarding of legal males has not occurred on a
similar scale since the initial season.47
Absentee ownership is also a problem, and
some quota holders lease their shares at rates
substantially higher than the actual value.
Managers therefore are considering alternatives
to require that shares be held by active
participants in the fishery.
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By 1991, despite no overfishing, the effects of
a drastically short season prompted the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council to take
steps to rationalize the fisheries and in 1995,
after many years of debate, an IFQ program was
implemented. Under this program, quota holders
can sell their fishing privileges as long as there
is no excessive consolidation or change in the
character of the fishing fleet. If an overage
occurs, up to 10 percent will be reduced from
the subsequent year’s quota and additional
overage is subject to a penalty.48
The initial allocation of quota was defined by
several objectives, including preserving the char-
acter of the fishing fleets, discouraging corporate
ownership and rewarding longtime and active
participants.49 As such, quotas were given only to
vessel owners or fishermen leasing vessels, with a
portion of the quota going to local communities
under a CDQ program. To preserve the character
of the fleet, vessel classes were created within
each fishery (three in sablefish and four in halibut).
Initially, quota holders were restricted to their ini-
tial vessel class to maintain the quota distribution
among vessel classes. Flexibility was later intro-
duced by allowing unused large-vessel quotas to
be reallocated to smaller vessels in the fishery.50
The Alaskan halibut and sablefish IFQ program is
considered successful in many respects: increased
economic efficiency, decreased operating costs,
higher prices at the dock, decreases in lost gear
and higher values for quota shares.51 There have
also been improvements in vessel safety (mea-
sured by a decrease in the number of search-and-
rescue operations), longer seasons, and greater
availability and quality of fish for consumers.
In addition, the fishery resource continues to
be sustainably managed.
Along with these improvements, however, are
downsides: lost jobs, high cost of entry into the
fishery, consolidation of quota holdings and
increased administration costs (in 2005, adminis-
tration and enforcement of these IFQ programs
cost the federal government $1.3 million and $2.4
million, respectively).52 Small coastal communities
in western Alaska were especially affected by the
program, and a CDQ was implemented through
Community Quota Entities (whose small-boat,
community-based fishermen with limited financial
opportunity struggle to raise sufficient capital to
enter the quota fisheries) to address these con-
cerns. More recently, fishermen can lease their
quota share in every halibut/sablefish area except
southeastern Alaska. This has changed the char-
acter of the fishing fleet because about half the
quota for each species is leased to and caught by
hired skippers rather than owner-operators.53
Leasing drives up the price of quota shares and
pushes out those with limited capital and other
resources. Absentee ownership and high entry
costs threaten one of the program’s goals of pro-
tecting small-scale, community-based fishermen.
Alaskan Halibut and Sablefish
In the late 1980s, the open access Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries were
prime examples of a race to fish, and overcapitalization led to seasons as short
as a day and fishing in hazardous weather.
15DESIGN MATTERS: MAKING CATCH SHARES WORK
C
A
SE
STU
D
IE
S
O
F
C
A
TC
H
SH
A
R
E
S
Due to tightened regulations and lowered
quotas—required for ending overfishing and
rebuilding this depleted population—the
commercial red snapper fishery became highly
overcapitalized; the number and fishing capacity
of the vessels in the fishery exceeded the amount
of allowable quota. In the late 1990s, the quota
was divided into two separate seasons open for
only the first 15 days of the month. To further
constrain catch, these seasons were reduced in
1999 to the first 10 days of the month. This small
window resulted in derby fishing with a rush to
fit as many trips in and catch as many fish as
possible in the available time. This in turn led to
instability in the supply of fresh red snapper to
markets, high levels of bycatch and unsafe condi-
tions for fishermen, all of which lowered prices.
A red snapper IFQ program, developed as
Amendment 26 to the Reef Fish Fishery
Management Plan,54 was implemented to reduce
overcapacity in the fishery and discourage derby
fishing.55 The overall intent of the program is to
help end overfishing and rebuild the red snapper
population. Specific anticipated benefits include:
• increased market stability
• replacing fishing seasons with year-round
fishing
• increased flexibility to modify fishing
operations
• cost-effective and enforceable
management of the fishery
• improved safety at sea
• optimized social, economic and biological
benefits from the fishery.
Also, the program is intended to provide direct
and indirect biological benefits to red snapper and
other marine resources by reducing bycatch and
discard mortality and eliminating quota overages.
Since implementation, after a further reduction
of the quota in 2008, the price paid to fishermen
has increased 17 percent, while average landings,
number of trips and days at sea have declined.
Coupled with the reduction in minimum size, the
ratio of landed to discarded fish has improved
threefold to fourfold, reducing overall mortality
by lowering the amount of discarded fish.
Between 1996 and 2003, the red snapper fleet
concentrated its fishing effort in an average of just
77 days to catch its quota. In the past two years,
however, that same effort has been spread across
an entire year. The IFQ program also provides a
better system of accounting for fishing activity.
In the past two years, annual landings have been
just shy of the allowed commercial quota—a
sharp improvement over the previous 17 years,
when the quota was exceeded nine times.
The IFQ program has resulted in fewer entities
in the commercial red snapper fishery.56 Before
the program was implemented, there were 764
permitted participants in the Gulf commercial
red snapper fishery. After implementation, 546
entities qualified for quota shares; now, after two
years of operation, the number of individuals
holding IFQs has dropped to 466, a 14.6 percent
reduction since the start of the program and a 39
percent reduction from pre-IFQ levels. In addition
to the consolidation that followed the IFQ pro-
gram’s implementation, other issues have arisen.
For example, catch reports have mislabeled
species and underreported landings. Bycatch also
remains a problem, particularly of other reef fish
encountered as the red snapper population
expands and returns to its historical range.
A commercial IFQ program for the red snapper fishery was implemented in the
Gulf of Mexico in January 2007. This population is categorized as overfished
and subject to overfishing because fishing levels remain too high.
Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper
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A sector is a community of fishermen who
voluntarily work together to manage an annual
allocation of fish. In exchange for operating under
higher standards of monitoring and reporting,
sector fishermen are given more flexibility in how
they fish and are offered exemptions from various
federal regulations. Sector members agree to
stop fishing once their allocation (enforceable
TAC) has been met.
In 2004, CCCHFA worked with local codfish
hook-and-line fishermen to develop the Georges
Bank Cod Hook Sector. By operating under their
own annual enforceable TAC of Georges Bank
cod, hook sector members are exempt from limits
on daily trips and the number of hooks they can
use. Furthermore, the fishermen of this sector are
allowed to determine how to divide this allocation
among members. The hook sector operates by
allocating monthly quota targets of 8.33 percent
of the sector’s total annual quota.57 Quota that is
not landed in a particular month is rolled over to
a subsequent month, and all cod fishing stops
when the annual quota is reached. The agree-
ment among these fishermen is codified in
federal regulations and in the form of a binding
annual contract. To prevent excessive consolida-
tion and unfair market control, the hook sector
cannot be allocated more than 20 percent of the
overall Georges Bank cod TAC. One problem
remains, however: fishermen are still bound by
regulations for days-at-sea and trip limits for all
other groundfish they catch.58
A second sector was developed by CCCHFA
in 2006—the Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear
Sector. This allowed local gillnet fishermen
the opportunity to join. Support for the sector
concept has spread throughout New England,
and Amendment 16 to the Groundfish Fishery
Management Plan would authorize an additional
17 sectors to be implemented in 2010. Sector
members would receive additional benefits,
including allocations of nearly all groundfish
species, transferability of quotas among sectors
and additional regulatory exemptions. The 20
percent cap on sector ownership would be
eliminated, and yearly overages would be
deducted from subsequent years. A minimum
of 30 percent observer coverage would be
required, as would weekly catch reports. Fishing
still would have to stop when a sector caught
its allocation.
The main benefit to fishermen is that they can
run their businesses more profitably and effi-
ciently by spending less time on the water and
by fishing when market prices are high. However,
the costs involved in producing environmental
assessments, operations plans and increased
monitoring must be borne by the fishermen.
These costs are shared by all sector participants
and can reach $80,000 to $100,000 a year for the
sector.59 One of the biggest concerns to sector
members is that while they operate under a
enforceable TAC and must stop fishing when they
meet their quota, the rest of the fishery that is not
part of a sector operates under an effort-control
system. Therefore, non-sector members will fish
with only a target TAC and will not be required to
immediately stop when that is reached. That, in
turn, can undermine any conservation gains.
Georges Bank Atlantic Cod Sectors
The Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association (CCCHFA) has
developed a form of community-based fisheries management that fosters
a highly adaptive means of local decision-making, self-monitoring and
enforcement known as sectors.
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If properly designed, catch share programs can
lead to substantial gains in fisheries by reducing
capacity, increasing economic efficiency and
ensuring sustainable catches. Poorly designed
programs, however, may induce unintended
behavior such as increased discarding, underre-
porting catch, misreporting catch or overfishing
of non-quota species.
While traditionally employed in commercial
fisheries, catch share programs are gaining
advocates for use in some recreational fisheries.
The application of catch shares needs careful
design and review, and ultimately may not be
feasible in many recreational fisheries as they
currently are managed. A key challenge is the
lack of real-time monitoring of recreational
catch, which allows managers to take action
before quotas are exceeded. Certain segments
of recreational fisheries, such as the for-hire
industry or charter boats, may be more willing
to explore a catch share program because of
existing licensing and reporting requirements,
which would serve as the basis for such
a program.
Lessons can be learned from the many IFQ
programs implemented to date. In the red king
crab fishery of the Bering Sea and Aleutian
Islands, consolidation and reduction in the fleet
led to a loss of jobs, and quotas for processors
restricted the market. Elsewhere in the North
Pacific, the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fishery
included clear objectives that guided the design
of the program, including the establishment of
vessel classes to preserve the character of the
initial fishing fleet. The halibut and sablefish IFQ
program succeeded in ending derby fishing and
extending the season, improving fishermen’s
safety and enhancing product quality. However,
recent developments, including the trend for
quota holders to hire captains to catch their
portion, are driving up leasing costs and
making it difficult for rural residents to enter or
stay in the fishery. In the Gulf of Mexico, the red
snapper IFQ program has shown initial benefits,
increasing the length of the season and the price
paid to fishermen, and reducing overcapacity in
the fishery. And in New England, sectors appear
to be a promising alternative to the historical
status quo. While there have been beneficial
outcomes across the country in the fisheries that
employ catch share programs, important issues
remain to be addressed in many of them.
Elements of Successful
Catch Share Programs
Catch share programs must include effective and
explicit policies that address overfishing, bycatch
and habitat protection. They should also contain
regulations to protect the health and resilience
of the marine ecosystems that sustain productive
fisheries. Finally, catch shares should also
accommodate recreational anglers and diverse
community-based fleets and crew that are the
heart and soul of a working waterfront.
For example, fishing businesses and communities
could be harmed by the consolidation of quotas
or by allocation schemes that favor just a few
participants. Consequently, catch shares should
be viewed as an allocation tool to be employed
only in certain fisheries after being carefully
designed to address potential social and
economic consequences.
When properly designed and implemented,
catch share programs can lead to better-man-
aged fisheries. They should be implemented,
however, only if science-based annual catch limits
are properly set to ensure that fish populations
are not subject to overfishing and that depleted
populations are rebuilt.
Conclusion
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All fishery management systems, including catch
share programs, require an infrastructure for
monitoring and accountability measures to ensure
that limits are not exceeded. They entail high
upfront costs to adequately handle the influx of
information and data. Additionally, a well-planned
program must include reliable monitoring and
enforcement as well as the ability to report
verifiable trip and catch information in real time.
These management imperatives, combined
with the experiences of established catch share
programs, underscore the importance of a
carefully designed program to meet both
conservation and socially responsible objectives.
Positive trends in fisheries are the result not
merely of catch share programs, but also of a
combination of measures—an enforceable TAC
and restrictions on fishing season and gear. Catch
shares should be viewed as an allocation tool that
is appropriate only with the right combination of
other management measures in a comprehensive
approach to fisheries management. As a critical
step in this approach, fisheries managers should
focus on setting science-based annual catch limits
that end overfishing and rebuild depleted popu-
lations, as well as defining equitable social
objectives for fishery management.
More specifically, catch share programs must
follow the design principles outlined below if
they are to succeed:
• science-based annual catch limits that include
all fish killed by fishing (target fish landed and
non-target fish—or bycatch—discarded at sea)
• adequate monitoring of the target fish catch
and the incidental catch of non-target species
• identification of explicit conservation, social
and economic goals and objectives and metrics
for measuring progress
• permits issued for no more than 10 years and
a regular evaluation of program performance,
with an opportunity to modify and improve it as
required by section 303A of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act
• adequate enforcement, including validated
catch and discard reporting and, to the extent
possible, real-time management that has the
power to close the fishery as soon as the quota
is reached
• fair and equitable quota allocation that is
conducted through a transparent and open
process, including mechanisms to provide
access opportunities to recreational anglers,
working fishermen and coastal communities;
ownership caps so that one entity does not hold
an excessive amount of quota; and opportuni-
ties for new fishermen to enter the fishery.
19DESIGN MATTERS: MAKING CATCH SHARES WORK
1 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), “What Is a
Catch Share?” (2009), www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/
catchshare.
2 Environmental Defense Fund, Sustaining America’s
Fisheries and Fishing Communities: An Evaluation of
Incentive-Based Management (2007), www.edf.org/
documents/6119_sustainingfisheries.pdf; and Oceans
of Abundance: An Action Agenda for America’s Vital
Fishing Future (2008), www.edf.org/documents/
8795_OceansOfAbundance.pdf.
3 Ibid.; and T. A. Branch, “How Do Individual Transferable
Quotas Affect Marine Ecosystems?” Fish and Fisheries,
10:39-57 (2009).
4 L. G. Anderson and M. C. Holliday (eds.), The Design and
Use of Limited Access Privilege Programs, NOAA Technical
Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-86, November 2007, www.nmfs.
noaa.gov/sfa/PartnershipsCommunications/lapp/design_
and_useLAPs2007.pdf.
5 Although we cannot offer a full legal analysis here of the
implications of what could be the privatization of a natural
public resource and the legal ramifications of doing so within
the public trust doctrine, we must draw attention to the fact
that legal issues with the catch shares approach to fisheries
management are unresolved.
6 16 U.S. Code §1802; Public Law 104-297; MSA §3(23).
7 E. H. Buck, “Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery
Management,” Congressional Research Service (95-849 ENR),
www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/marine/mar-1.cfm.
8 16 U.S. Code 1853a §303(a).
9 Anderson and Holliday, Design and Use.
10 Ibid.
11 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Individual Fishing
Quotas: Methods for Community Protection and New Entry
Require Periodic Evaluation, GAO-04-277, February 2004,
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04277.pdf.
12 P.L. 94-265 as amended by P.L. 109-479.
13 16 U.S. Code 1853 §303(b)(6).
14 16 U.S. Code 1853a (f) §303A(f).
15 16 U.S. Code 1853a §303A (e).
16 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for
the 21st Century. Final Report. Washington, D.C., 2004,
http://oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/
000_ocean_full_report.pdf.
17 Sustainable Harvest Sector, Port Clyde Community
Groundfish Sector, New Bedford Deep Water Trawl Sector,
New Bedford and Southern New England Fixed Gear Sector,
New Bedford Channel Trawl Sector, New Hampshire and
Southern Maine Fixed Gear Sector and Trawl Gulf of Maine
Sector, Gloucester Trawl/Western Gulf of Maine Sector,
Gloucester Fixed Gear Sector, Gloucester/Boston Trawl Gulf
of Maine and Georges Bank Sector, South Shore Trawl Sector
and Fixed Gear Sector, Port Judith and Southern New England
Offshore Trawl Sector and Trawl Sector, Tri-State Sector, Pier 6
Initiative and Martha’s Vineyard Community Sector.
18 T. Smith et al., “Fishing for More Effective Incentives,”
letter to the editor, Science, 323:337-8 (Jan. 16, 2009),
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/323/5912/337b.pdf.
19 N. C. Ban et al., “Diverse Fisheries Require Diverse
Solutions,” letter to the editor, Science, 323:338 (Jan. 16,
2009), www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/323/5912/337b.pdf.
20 C. Wallace and B. Weeber, “Deep-Sea Fisheries: The
Lessons of Experience,” Policy Quarterly, 1:10-17 (2005).
21 Ecotrust Canada and Ecotrust, “Catch-22: Conservation,
Communities and the Privatization of B.C. Fisheries. An
Economic, Social and Ecological Impact Study,” Vancouver,
B.C., Canada, November 2004, http://aquacomm.fcla.edu/
1686/1/Catch-22-November2004.pdf.
22 C. Costello and R. Deacon, “The Efficiency Gains From
Fully Delineating Rights in an ITQ Fishery,” Marine Resource
Economics, 22 (2007): 347-61, http://fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu/
~costello/research/papers/MRE_2008.pdf.
23 National Research Council, “Sharing the Fish: Toward a
National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas,” Washington,
D.C.: National Academies Press, 1999, www.nap.edu/open-
book.php?record_id=6335&page=1.
24 C. Chu, “Thirty Years Later: The Global Growth of ITQs and
Their Influence on Stock Status in Marine Fisheries,” Fish and
Fisheries, 10:1-14 (2008); E. Pinkerton and D. Edwards, “The
Elephant in the Room: The Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual
Transferable Fishing Quotas,” Marine Policy, 33(4), 707-713;
and Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, Committee for Fisheries, Towards Sustainable
Fisheries: Economic Aspects of the Management of Living
Marine Resources, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/document/
62/0,3343,en_2649_33901_2508478_1_1_1_1,00.html.
25 National Research Council, “Sharing the Fish.”
26 Ecotrust Canada and Ecotrust, “A Cautionary Tale About
ITQs in B.C. Fisheries,” Vancouver, B.C., Canada (2009),
http://ecotrust.ca/fisheries/cautionarytale.
27 Ban et al., letter to the editor.
28 Ecotrust Canada and Ecotrust, “Catch-22.”
29 Ibid.
30 GAO. Individual Fishing Quotas, p.2.
31 Chu, “Thirty Years Later.”
32 Ibid., p.11.
33 Ibid.
Endnotes
34 T. A. Branch and R. Hilborn, “Matching Catches to Quotas
in a Multispecies Trawl Fishery: Targeting and Avoidance
Behavior Under Individual Transferable Quotas,” Canadian
Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 65:1435-46 (2008),
http://rparticle.web-p.cisti.nrc.ca/rparticle/AbstractTemplate
Servlet?calyLang=eng&journal=cjfas&volume=65&year=2008
&issue=7&msno=f08-065.
35 North Pacific Fishery Management Council, DRAFT Council
Motion for Item C-5 BSAI Crab Rationalization (June 10, 2002),
www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/current_issues/crab/CouncilCrabM
otion602.pdf.
36 North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Fishery
Management Plan for Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands King
and Tanner Crabs (December 2008), www.fakr.noaa.gov/
npfmc/fmp/crab/CRAFMP2008.pdf.
37 J. Bruce McDonald, deputy assistant attorney general,
Antitrust Division, U.S. Justice Department, statement before
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation (Feb. 25, 2004), www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
testimony/202572.htm.
38 S. C. Matulich, “Did Processing Quota Damage Alaska Red
King Crab Harvesters? Empirical Evidence,” Marine Resource
Economics 23:253-71 (2008), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/54121/2/02-Matulich.pdf.
39 G. Knapp and M. Lowe, “Economic and Social Impacts of
BSAI Crab Rationalization on the Communities of King Cove,
Akutan and False Pass,” Institute of Social and Economic
Research, University of Alaska in Anchorage (November 2007),
www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/Crab_Rationalization_fin
al_KnappLowe.pdf.
40 Ibid.
41 M. Bauman, “Alaska communities adjust to reality of crab
rationalization,” Alaska Journal of Commerce (Jan. 23, 2006),
www.juneauempire.com/stories/012306/sta_20060123003.shtml.
42 G. Knapp, “Economic Impacts of BSAI Crab Rationalization
on Kodiak Fishing Employment and Earnings and Kodiak
Businesses: A Preliminary Analysis,” Institute of Social and
Economic Research, University of Alaska in Anchorage
(May 2006), www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/iser/people/Knapp/
Knapp_Kodiak_Crab_Rationalization_Preliminary_Report.pdf.
43 North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Leasing prac-
tices in North Pacific fisheries: Bering Sea and Aleutian Island
crab fisheries (June 2009), www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/current_
issues/crab/leasingPractices509.pdf.
44 Knapp, “Economic Impacts.”
45 W. Loy, “Federal figures reveal top crabbers, processors,”
Pacific Fishing (October 2005).
46 D. R. Barnard and D. Pengilly, “Estimates of red king crab
bycatch during the 2005/2006 Bristol Bay king crab fishery with
comparisons to the 1999-2004 seasons,” Alaska Department
of Fish and Game, Fishery Data Series No. 06-23, Anchorage
(2006), www.sf.adfg.state.ak.us/FedAidPDFs/fds06-23.pdf.
47 North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Three-Year
Review of the Crab Rationalization Management Program for
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries (Nov. 12, 2008),
www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/current_issues/crab/3yearreview
1208.pdf.
48 M. Hartley and M. Fina, “Changes in Fleet Capacity
Following the Introduction of Individual Vessel Quotas in the
Alaskan Pacific Halibut and Sablefish Fishery,” in Case Studies
on the Effects of Transferable Fishing Rights on Fleet Capacity
and Concentration of Quota Ownership, Fisheries Technical
Paper 412 (2001), U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization,
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y2498e/y2498e06.pdf.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Anderson and Holliday, Design and Use of Limited Access.
53 Linda Behnken, personal communication, July 2009.
54 Notice of Final Rule (50 CFR part 622.16) Amendment 26.
Gulf Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Program,
Federal Register 71:67447-62 (Nov. 22, 2008), http://frweb-
gate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=296
98918059+26+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve.
55 2008 Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota
Annual Report. Southeast Region, NMFS, St. Petersburg, Fla.
(Aug. 17, 2009), SERO-LAPP-2009-08, 25 pages, http://sero.
nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/pdfs/2008RedSnapperIFQAnnual
Report1.pdf.
56 Final Amendment 26 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery
Management Plan to Establish a Red Snapper Individual
Fishing Quota Program, March 2006, www.gulfcouncil.org/
Beta/GMFMCWeb/downloads/Amend26031606FINAL.pdf
56 Final Amendment 26 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery
Management Plan to Establish a Red Snapper Individual
Fishing Quota Program. March 2006, www.gulfcouncil.org/
Beta/GMFMCWeb/downloads/Amend26031606FINAL.pdf
57 Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector Inc., 2007 Annual Report,
North Chatham, Mass. http://www.ccchfa.org/documents/
CCCHFA_AR_2007.pdf
58 Ibid.
59 Eric Brazer Jr., sector manager, Cape Cod Commercial
Hook Fishermen’s Association, Personal communication,
October 2009.
THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP20
Endnotes (continued)

Philadelphia, PA 19103
Tel. 215.575.9050
www.pewenvironment.org
Washington, DC 20004
Tel. 202.552.2000
Contact:
Lee R. Crockett
LCrockett@pewtrusts.org
202.552.2065
